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Descartes and the dissolution of life 
Barnaby R. Hutchins 
ABSTRACT: I argue that Descartes is not a reductionist about life, but dissolves or 
eliminates the category entirely. This is surprising both because he repeatedly refers to the 
life of humans, animals, and plants and because he appears to rely on the category of life to 
construct his physiology and medicine. Various attempts have been made in the scholarship 
to attribute a principled concept of life to Descartes. Most recently, Detlefsen 
(forthcoming) has argued that Descartes “is a reductionist with respect to explanation of life 
phenomena but not an eliminativist with respect to life itself” (4–5). I show that all these 
attempts either result in arbitrariness or force Descartes’s wider philosophical project into 
incoherence. I argue that Descartes’s ontological commitments make a principled concept 
of life impossible, that he does not need such a concept, and that his project ends up more 
coherent without one. 
KEYWORDS: Descartes; reductionism; eliminativism; life; concept 
1. Introduction 
When it comes to the natural world (the world of material substance), Descartes very 
explicitly positions himself as a strict reductionist: there is matter in motion, and absolutely 
nothing more (Principles 1/48). It might appear that this works well enough when he 
discusses vortices or rainbows, and explains them in terms of efficient causation between 
minute particles of matter (although even these cases are not always straightforward).1 It 
starts to look more problematic when he employs terms that, on the face of it, do seem to 
                                                   
1 See Hutchins (forthcoming a) on the limits of this corpuscular mechanism in Descartes’s physiology. 
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require something more than matter in motion. We see this, as the literature has pointed 
out, in the apparent teleology implicit in Descartes’s use of functio, usus, or office.2 We also 
see it when he talks about life (vita, vie). 
Life ought not to be a category for Descartes. For the scholastics, to whom Descartes was 
responding on this issue, the vegetative soul could do the work of distinguishing 
ontologically between the animate and the inanimate: whatever had a vegetative soul was 
alive; whatever did not was not. This avenue was not open to Descartes. His ontology allows 
for only one kind of soul, which consists of thinking and absolutely nothing more—and 
animating a body is not, on his understanding, a kind of thinking (to Regius, May 1641; AT 
III: 371). Consequently, in Descartes’s ontology, there should be no more of a “difference 
between living and lifeless things than there is between a clock or other automaton on the 
one hand, and a key or sword or other non-self-moving appliance on the other” (to Regius, 
June 1642; CSMK: 214; AT III: 566). In other words, life can have no special ontological 
distinction. 
And yet Descartes persists in referring to “life” and to “living things.” He does not “deny life 
to animals” (to More, 5 February 1649; CSMK 366; AT V, 278). He admits that severed 
heads that “continue to move about and bite the earth” are “no longer alive” (Discourse 5; 
CSM I, 139; AT VI, 55; my emphasis). He repeatedly brings up his own “principle of life”—a 
                                                   
2 See, e.g., Brown (2011), Canguilhem ([1965] 1980), Des Chene 2001 (§6.1, 117f.), Distelzweig (2015), Simmons 2001, and 
Shapiro 2003. 
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material, Cartesian alternative to the Aristotelian vegetative and sensitive souls.3 And in the 
letter to Regius quoted above, he goes on to say that, 
[s]ince ‘self-moving’ is a category with respect to all machines that move of 
their own accord, which excludes others that are not self-moving, so ‘life’ may 
be taken as a category which includes the forms of all living things 
(to Regius, June 1642; CSMK: 214; AT III: 566). 
So, although life ought not to be a category for Descartes, he appears to make it one. The 
problem is that, as both MacKenzie (1975: 2–3) and Detlefsen (forthcoming: 9) point out, 
Descartes never provides a general concept of life. Given that his metaphysics does not 
allow him an ontological differentiation, it is not at all clear how the category of life can 
possibly be defined within his philosophical system. Just as it struggles with teleology, a 
purely material, mechanical ontology seems to lack the resources to separate out living 
creatures from the rest of the material world. 
In what follows, I first assess the various suggestions for a Cartesian concept of life as found 
in the literature (§2). There has been a series of systematic attempts to unearth a principled 
concept of life for Descartes, starting with MacKenzie (1975), who builds on some ideas 
from Hall (1970). The task is taken up again by Ablondi (1998) and then by Detlefsen 
(forthcoming). All take Descartes to have a general, principled concept of life, and each sees 
him as a reductionist, in one way or another, about that concept. They take him to reduce 
life to some thing, or to some set of things, in the material world (for Ablondi and 
Detlefsen, God also has a role to play in the reduction). Each of these articles shows how 
                                                   
3 E.g. in the Treatise on Man (AT XI, 202) and the Treatise on the Passions of the Soul (1:6; AT XI: 330–1). See Bitbol–Hespériès 
(1990) for an extensive treatment; Hutchins (forthcoming b) argues that Descartes has no single, underlying principle of 
life. 
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the concept put forward by its immediate predecessor is inadequate, arbitrary, or just plain 
wrong, before offering an alternative concept of its own. 
My claim here is that the reason all these purported concepts of life turn out to be so 
unsatisfying is that looking for a general, principled concept of life in Descartes is the wrong 
approach to start with (§3). Since he is entirely clear that life (whatever it might be) does not 
pertain to thinking substance (Passions 1/5; AT XI: 329), it cannot be reducible to pure 
thought. But because his material ontology lacks the resources to discriminate the living 
from the non-living, there is nothing in extended substance for life to be reduced to either. 
And, as Detlefsen points out (25; 40–1), Descartes commits himself to the inscrutability of 
God, for good reasons (AT VII: 55, 374–5), thus making God unavailable to support a 
concept of life. There is nowhere in Descartes’s ontology for a concept of life to reside. 
The more suitable approach, then, is to think that Descartes does away with a concept of 
life (§3.1). He does not reduce it to something material. He does not look to God’s 
intentions. What he does is dissolve or eliminate the category. Rather than addressing his 
account of physiology to the nature of life itself, and to finding a material source for it, 
Descartes takes on the traditional phenomena of physiology (cardiac heat, respiration, 
nutrition, generation, etc.) one by one and provides a material explanation for each. These 
explanations do not afford the reconstitution of any general, univocal concept of life. 
Consequently, in the process, the concept is dissolved away.4 If I am right about this, it 
means that Descartes recognised something that Machery has far more recently proposed 
                                                   
4 Cf. Wolfe, who argues that there was no early modern controversy over life because there was “no polarization between 
Life and non-Life” (2011: 192). Descartes is, however, responding to a problem driven by a polarisation between life and 
non-life; it just turns out that this is a problem that arises with respect to a tradition he rejects (see §3.2). 
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for modern biology: that “the project of defining life is either impossible or pointless” (2011: 
145). 
There are parallels between this reading of Descartes and eliminativist materialist positions 
with respect to the mind. In eliminative materialism, “thoughts,” “beliefs,” “mind states,” 
etc. are merely the terms of folk psychology, and they fail to refer to anything real. That is, 
there is nothing to which they can be reduced. As such, neuroscience has no need to 
attempt to explain them (nor could it): mind states should be eliminated from the science, 
which should focus instead on physical brain states. In his landmark paper on the 
elimination of propositional attitudes, Paul Churchland concludes 
[t]he propositional attitudes of folk psychology do not constitute an 
unbreachable barrier to the advancing tide of neuroscience. On the contrary, 
the principled displacement of folk psychology is not only richly possible, it 
represents one of the most intriguing theoretical displacements we can 
currently imagine 
(1981: 90). 
Similarly, doing away with the notion of life itself is, presumably, a productive displacement 
that gives Descartes new possibilities (such as pervasive iatromechanism) for his work on 
physiology and medicine. 
There are several advantages to the “dissolutionist” reading. Most importantly, it makes 
sense of the complete absence of an attempt to work out a general concept of life anywhere 
in Descartes’s work and correspondence (if the lack of a concept of life “would render 
incoherent” Descartes’s work on physiology and medicine, as Detlefsen claims 
(forthcoming: 2), for him to ignore it as he does would be a significant oversight). It is also 
non-arbitrary, in a way that MacKenzie-style lists of necessary life-functions are not (see 
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§2.3). And it remains consistent with both Descartes’s ontological and theological 
commitments. 
On the other hand, it might appear difficult for the dissolutionist reading to make sense of 
Descartes’s use of the term “life.” This problem is dealt with in §3.2. One answer may be 
that Descartes uses “life” as a folk term, without any strict definition. I argue, though, that 
most instances of Descartes’s use of “life” are responses to the Aristotelian position, where 
the term is well defined. Descartes’s intention is to show that all the phenomena associated 
with life in the Aristotelian system are explicable under his own; this does not entail a 
subscription to the category of life itself. Concerns about whether Descartes can allow 
disciplinary unity to biology5 in the absence of a concept of life are addressed in §3.3. There, 
I argue that Descartes has no particular need for a principled unification of the discipline, 
and that whatever unity it may have is provided not by life but by (human) medicine. This 
allows life itself to be redundant for Cartesian biology. 
2. Concepts of life 
2.1 Cardiac heat 
Although Descartes never provides a general definition of life, he does frequently associate 
life with heat. For instance, he writes to Mersenne, 
                                                   
5 The term is anachronistic, of course, but efficient. 
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[b]ut as to why you say that we cannot explain this phenomenon while 
allowing no principle of life other than heat to animals, it seems to me, on the 
contrary, that we could explain it better in no other way; given that heat is a 
common principle for animals, plants, and other bodies, it is no surprise that it 
should serve to make humans and plants live 
(AT III: 122; my emphases). 
So heat makes humans, plants, and animals live. But whatever Descartes might take life to 
be, it cannot come down to heat alone. This is because, as Descartes puts it, heat is a 
principle common to not just humans, animals, and plants, but also to “other bodies.” That 
is, heat is also a principle of inorganic bodies.6 There are plenty of things in the natural 
world that are both warm and clearly non-living. Consequently, there is nothing about heat 
in itself that distinguishes between living and non-living. So if Descartes has a concept of 
life, and if that concept involves heat, it must involve heat in addition something else. 
That something else would appear to be the heart. Descartes makes various seemingly 
straightforward statements such as “I do not deny life to animals, since I regard it as 
consisting simply in the heat of the heart” (to More, 5 February 1649; CSMK: 366; AT V, 
278). Elsewhere, he appears to identify cardiac heat as the principle of life (AT VI: 46; AT 
XI: 202; AT XI: 333). When Descartes appeals to this principle of life, and when he claims 
that life consists in cardiac heat, it certainly looks like a reduction of the concept of life to a 
material process.7 This would suggest that his concept of life is the following.8 
                                                   
6 It is central to Descartes’s argument to Mersenne here that prevalence of heat as a motive force in inorganic phenomena 
is good reason to think it plays a role in organic phenomena too. 
7 Cardiac heat is generated entirely mechanically and materially on Descartes’s account. See Fuchs 2001, part D.I for a 
detailed description. 
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LifeCH := the possession of a warm heart 
There is an obvious problem with taking LifeCH to be Descartes’s concept of life: we want 
to describe plants as living, but would not want to attribute warm hearts to them.9 In 
addition, Descartes is quite clear that cardiac heat alone is not sufficient for life: 
the tiny heart of an eel, which I cut out before seven or eight o’clock this 
morning, revives when a little heat is applied to its surface, and begins to beat 
again quite rapidly, even though it is obviously dead 
(23 March 1638; CSMK: 95; AT II: 66; my emphasis). 
In this case, the heart is warm (and even beating) but nevertheless does not qualify as 
living.10 Cardiac heat, therefore, cannot be not sufficient for life on Descartes’s account. 
Consequently, if Descartes has a concept of life, it cannot be LifeCH. 
2.2 Cardiac heat plus an ensemble of life-functions 
When we say that LifeCH cannot be Descartes’s concept of life, the objection that 
immediately springs to mind is that cardiac heat might not be sufficient by itself but could 
still be necessary when buttressed by some other condition for life. In this case, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
8 This seems to be the concept of life presupposed in Bitbol-Hespériès 1990 (see especially 40 and 96). LifeCH is also 
endorsed (although only in passing) by Canguilhem ([1965] 1980: 111). 
9 In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes attributes heat to the life of plants (30 July 1640; AT III: 122), but not hearts. See p. 7 
above. Ablondi (1998: 183) cites a passage from the Cogitationes as more evidence for the same, although Descartes’s concern 
there is with the role of heat for the development of plants and animals rather than for life itself. 
10 An alternative reading of this passage might claim that the heart really does come back to life (the use of “revives” 
(reviviscere) would support that reading). However, from the context, it is clear that Descartes’s aim is to show that the 
phenomenon of the heartbeat can be reproduced at a point after an Aristotelian would say the soul has left the body. 
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reduction of life would be to cardiac heat plus one or more other material processes. This 
appears to be Hall’s approach to the Cartesian concept of life: 
LifeH := “an ensemble of functions that have their kinetic origin in 
heat—specifically a certain ‘fire without light’ that burns, in men and 
animals, in the heart” (Hall 1970: 61). 
LifeH deals nicely with the case of the dead-but-warm eel heart: the eel heart is dead because 
it is not acting as the source of movement for some ensemble of functions. If the eel’s warm 
heart were instead driving its life functions, it (or, rather, the eel) would be alive. Hall does 
not identify these functions, leaving LifeH, as it stands, somewhat vague. But the principle 
behind it is straightforward: life is not simply the heat of the heart, but a group of life-
functions that are driven by the heat of the heart. It is the combination of cardiac heat with 
the ensemble of functions that is meant to provide sufficiency to the concept. In this case, 
it does not matter too much exactly what the functions are: they are life functions precisely 
because they are driven by the heat of the heart that is unique to living bodies. The life-
functions are necessary here just because cardiac heat alone is insufficient for life, but it is 
still cardiac heat that does the bulk of the work in LifeH. 
The immediate problem is that LifeH, in this form, would rule out plant life (because plants 
do not have hearts)—and Descartes seems to be just as willing to ascribe life to plants as to 
animals. In both the Principles (4:188; AT VIIIA: 315) and the Description of the Human Body 
(AT XI: 247), he glosses “living things” as both plants and animals, and in the conversation 
with Burman, Descartes mentions prolonging the lives of plants as a model for prolonging 
human life (AT V: 178). If we want to find a concept of life in Descartes, the basic form of 
LifeH is evidently going to be too exclusive. 
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There might be some traction in generalising the definition by omitting the specification 
after the dash in Hall’s formulation: 
LifeH2 := an ensemble of functions that have their kinetic origin in 
heat. 
This obviates the need to refer to the heart itself. And since there is at least one instance in 
which Descartes claims that plants too are driven by heat (AT III: 122), LifeH2 is inclusive 
enough to account for plant life. However, without the restriction of specifically cardiac heat 
and its fire without light, the concept becomes too inclusive. Take, for example, the heating 
and water-boiling functions of a stove. They have their kinetic origin in heat.11 If we want an 
overarching concept of life, presumably we want it to exclude stoves while including plants. 
Since heat as kinetic origin is not specific enough to provide that restriction, it makes sense 
to look to the functions themselves: if it is only certain functions that are life-functions, and 
if water-boiling and heating are not on the list, the concept can effectively exclude stoves 
while including humans, animals, and plants. In the next section, I look at how MacKenzie 
builds on exactly this basis in attempting to specify a Cartesian concept of life (1975: 4). 
2.3 A list of life-functions 
Where LifeH relied on the specificity of cardiac heat as source of motion to identify a given 
function as a life-function, MacKenzie explicitly moves the burden of specification to the 
functions themselves: 
[t]he principle of motion in plants and animals without hearts will be that 
which (together with proper structure) enables them to engage in those 
determinate activities which in turn enable them to perform their life 
                                                   
11 Heating is always kinetic for Descartes. See The World, part 1, ch. 2 (AT XI: 7–10). 
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functions. [. . .] Although all living creatures perform the same set of life 
functions, because of the vast set of differences among animate creatures, the 
determinate activities that enable them to perform the life functions differ 
(MacKenzie 1975: 10). 
This is a straightforward reversal of the hierarchy in LifeH. The life-functions are constant, 
but the activities that produce them can differ—in some cases, it will be cardiac heat that 
drives the life-functions, and in others it will be something else. On MacKenzie’s reading, 
rather than doing the bulk of the work in defining life, cardiac heat gets to be involved in 
life only if it produces life-functions. It is the functions themselves that do the work. 
Indeed, activities such as cardiac heat will figure in MacKenzie’s definition only in the 
general stipulation that they be mechanical and material, so as to rule out psychistic 
principles of life (1975: 6). 
The functions MacKenzie identifies as life-functions are simply nutrition, growth and 
generation (1975: 8). Accordingly, her (explicitly stated) definition is 
LifeMK := “x is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts which 
(together with motion) enables x to gain nourishment from its 
environment, to grow, and to reproduce” (1975: 8). 
In this definition, cardiac heat has been generalised to an arrangement of parts plus motion, 
which is inclusive enough to allow life to humans, animals, and plants, as well as to any other 
living thing that might happen to operate in a different manner. It rules out psychistic 
explanations via the suppressed assumption that parts are necessarily material. According to 
LifeMK, anything, heartless or not, will count as alive as long as it gains nourishment from its 
environment, grows, and reproduces. In this case, LifeMK is meant to reduce life to a set of 
processes (life-functions) that are material by virtue of the arrangement-of-parts 
prescription. 
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Since the three life-functions are doing the work in LifeMK, we would expect them to be 
robustly specified and well grounded. If we are to rely on nutrition, growth and generation 
in order to determine what is alive and what is not, presumably we ought to be reasonably 
sure that nutrition, growth and generation are the right functions to use. Curiously, this is 
not what happens. MacKenzie tells us, “I can only speculate as to which functions Descartes 
would include on his list” (1975: 8), and readily acknowledges that the nutrition–growth–
generation list itself “may be incorrect” (1975: 8, n. 16). Her point is that some particular list 
will do the job, and that it is not necessary to specify it accurately in order to show that 
Descartes’s conception of life will look like LifeMK (with a better list substituted if, in fact, 
appropriate): “a decision on precisely which functions Descartes would list is not necessary 
for a general understanding of Descartes' conception of life” (1975: 8, n. 16). 
The first problem with LifeMK is that, with the life-functions doing the work, a decision on 
precisely which functions they are is entirely necessary for the concept to be meaningful. 
Without that decision, LifeMK becomes empty and arbitrary. With the list removed, LifeMK 
would read, “x is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts which (together with 
motion) enables x to perform some set of functions.” This formulation would apply to any 
functioning machine; it only becomes specific to life when that set of functions is specified. 
Without the life-functions, LifeMK tells us nothing about life. In the absence of those 
functions, there is nothing for life to be reduced to. The second problem is that, as 
MacKenzie herself seems to be aware (1975: 8), there is no evidence that Descartes saw life 
in this way: he does not appeal to a set of functions as constitutive of life, and he does not 
seem to identify any particular function as constitutively necessary for life. As such, there is 
little to no scope for finding a set of functions in Descartes’s work that can flesh out LifeMK 
and save it from vacuity. 
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2.4 Heat plus theogenic complexity 
Ablondi broadly accepts LifeMK, but argues that a “more basic” criterion than a set of life-
functions is available (1998: 183; emphasis in original). That more basic criterion is 
complexity. The main evidence for complexity as constitutive of life comes from the Treatise 
on Man: 
[w]e see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and other such machines which, 
although only man-made, have the power to move of their own accord in 
many different ways. But I am supposing this machine [the human body] to 
be made by the hands of God, and so I think you may reasonably think it 
capable of a greater variety of movements than I could possibly imagine in it, 
and of exhibiting more artistry than I could possibly ascribe to it 
(CSM I: 99; AT XI: 120). 
In this passage, Descartes emphasises a difference between, on the one hand, manmade 
machines and, on the other, God-made machines capable of “a greater variety of 
movements” than is even imaginable by man (or at least by Descartes) and that display a 
greater level of craftsmanship than Descartes could ever attribute to them. The message is 
that we humans know what it is to make machines, but our clocks and fountains are 
monumentally crude in comparison to the machine of the human body made by God. It is 
not much of a stretch to see this as a distinction in complexity between living and non-living 
machines: living machines are significantly more complex than non-living ones. Hence, 
following the general format of both Hall’s and MacKenzie’s versions, Ablondi formulates a 
concept of life for Descartes as follows: 
LifeA := “(1) possession of an internal source of heat which serves as a 
principle of motion, and (2) having the complexity which only God can 
give a thing” (Ablondi 1998: 185). 
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Ablondi presumably includes (1) so as to rule out complex theogenic artefacts we would not 
want to classify as living, such as vortices. He does not spell this out explicitly, but he does 
note that (2) is not sufficient by itself (1998: 185). On Ablondi’s reading, given Descartes’s 
few remarks about heat as their principle of life, plants are included by (1) (1998: 183); (2) is 
necessary so as to exclude heat-driven manmade automata (1998: 183). 
It is significant that the complexity stipulated by (2) is the kind of complexity that only God 
can provide. For Ablondi, the difference in complexity between living and non-living 
machines cannot be a difference of degree. The difference is between what humans are 
capable of producing and what God is capable of producing, and “Descartes would be 
presuming clairvoyancy if he were to limit what human technology ever could do” (1998: 
184)—i.e. if it were only a matter of degree, Descartes could not reasonably suppose that 
human technology would never be capable of reaching that degree. Consequently, while 
human bodies undoubtedly do have a higher degree of complexity than clocks, they must 
also have a different kind of complexity—a theogenic kind of complexity (1998: 184–5). 
Ablondi himself recognises the problem with theogenic complexity: 
there must be some recognizable feature flowing from this complexity which 
enables us to conclude that we can’t produce things that complex. To say this 
feature is ‘life’ is to beg the question; the complexity of the thing has to be 
identifiable apart from its divine origin if the claim is to function as a genuine 
criterion 
(1998: 184). 
The trouble is that the mechanical complexity of the human body–machine exists entirely 
within the material world. The material world can accommodate different degrees of 
complexity perfectly well, in that we can give criteria for different degrees of complexity in 
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material terms: more parts, smaller parts, more interactions between parts, etc. Material 
terms for the type of distinction in kind that LifeA requires are elusive. Descartes’s 
ontology, which allows nothing but “shape, size, position and motion of particles of matter” 
(CSM I: 279; AT VIIIA: 314) in extended substance does not permit ontologically distinct 
kinds of material complexity. Ablondi notes that this problem is “quite damaging” (1998: 
185) to LifeA. His position appears to be that, although LifeA is incoherent with respect to 
Descartes’s system (i.e. it is not compatible with his commitments elsewhere), textual 
evidence suggests that it is nevertheless the conception of life that Descartes held. 
I do not think, however, that the textual evidence bears out this conclusion. The evidence 
that Ablondi cites is sparse. Besides the passage from Man, there is a brief passage from the 
Discourse (in the context of a summary of the then-unpublished Man): “they will regard this 
body as a machine which, having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better 
ordered than any machine that can be devised by man” (CSM I: 139; AT VI: 56). There is also 
a letter to More in which Descartes remarks, “since [. . .] people can make various 
automatons which move without thought, it seems reasonable that nature should even 
produce its own automatons, which are much more splendid than artificial ones – namely 
the animals” (5 February 1649; CSMK: 366; AT V: 277). This is not especially conclusive. In 
none of these passages does Descartes indicate that greater complexity is constitutive of 
life, rather than being merely a contingent feature of animal and human bodies. 
In the letter to More, Descartes is arguing against animal intelligence and is attempting to 
deflect the objection that animal behaviour is too close to intelligent human behaviour to be 
thoughtless. His strategy is to show that animal behaviour is on a continuum with that of 
manmade automata, rather than with human thought. It should not be too surprising, he 
reminds More, if natural automata happen to be noticeably more “splendid” (praestantiora) 
than their manmade equivalents. In summing up his argument, he explicitly tells More, 
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“[p]lease note that I am speaking of thought, and not of life” (CSMK: 366; AT V: 278). 
Evidently, Descartes is not making the claim here that this splendidness is constitutive of 
life. 
The passages from Man and the Discourse offer a little more support to LifeA, given their 
appeals to modality: the human body has “a greater variety of movements than I could 
possibly imagine in it” and exhibits “more artistry than I could possibly ascribe to it” (CSM I: 
99; AT XI: 120; my emphases); the human body is “incomparably better ordered than any 
machine that can be devised by man” (CSM I: 139; AT VI: 56; my emphasis). Taken literally, 
these comments do suggest that there is a kind of complexity that humans are incapable of 
ever producing, or even of ever imagining. It is not at all clear, however, that these 
comments should be taken literally. Descartes positions the Treatise on Man as a fable about 
a hypothetical mechanical human body that God could create.12 Even if the conclusions of 
the treatise are ultimately meant to transfer to the actual world, the passage quoted above is 
from the opening of the extant text, where the rhetoric of the fable is still being set up. 
There is more here, then, to suggest that the modal claims are rhetorical appeals to the 
greatness of God (especially given Descartes’s fears about the Inquisition’s possible reaction 
to his World, of which Man is a part13) than that they are principled commitments to an 
ontologically distinct kind of complexity. Indeed, in a letter to Mersenne, Descartes 
explicitly makes the point that, metaphysically, we should be able to build an artificial bird, 
even if, “speaking as a physicist,” we do not know how to make sufficiently intricate (subtils) 
springs (30 August 1640; AT III: 163–4): the problem is technical rather than ontological. 
                                                   
12 See the editors’ note in CSM I, p. 99, n. 1. 
13 See to Mersenne, end of November 1633 (AT I: 270–2). 
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Furthermore, whatever the difference in complexity between living and non-living 
machines, Descartes gives us no reason to suppose that greater complexity is a necessary 
condition in defining life. 
Lastly, the evidence that Ablondi cites is entirely concerned with human and animal bodies. 
Descartes never suggests that plants are more complex than we could possibly imagine. Of 
course, it is plausible that, if asked, Descartes would have replied that this applies to plants 
as much as it does to animals. But Ablondi’s justification for attributing a concept of life to 
Descartes that is incoherent with his wider system is the textual evidence. And even on the 
most generous reading of the textual evidence for the relevance of theogenic complexity, 
plants are absent. On a textual basis, then, it would not be unfair to say that LifeA excludes 
plants, and as such, by Ablondi’s own criteria, does not even provide a viable concept of life. 
LifeA attempts to conceptualise life by reducing it to two things in the material world: (1) 
heat as an underlying source of motion plus (2) theogenic complexity. Theogenic 
complexity, however, is not definable in terms of matter. Ablondi is aware of this but thinks 
the textual evidence warrants attributing a concept of life to Descartes that is incoherent 
with his system. The incoherence alone would be enough to call for suspicion, but, as we 
have seen, the textual evidence itself also turns out to provide little support for LifeA. 
2.5 God’s intentions 
The treatments of life we have looked at so far have all tried to find a concept of life 
through reduction to something in the material world. There are good reasons for this 
approach, given Descartes’s repeated insistence that life pertains to extended substance, and 
not to thinking substance. Detlefsen, however, recognises that extended substance does not 
have the resources to sustain a concept of life; the purely material conditions will have to be 
shored up by something extramaterial. For Detlefsen, the extramaterial ingredient lies in 
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God’s intentions.  Bringing in God to confer life circumvents the lack of appropriate 
resources in matter. 
Detlefsen broadly accepts LifeMK, but extends MacKenzie’s list of life-functions to include 
reactivity to the environment as well as nutrition, growth, and generation, all subtended by 
another addition, a single overarching life-function: self-preservation (19–21). The following 
is, I think, a fair reconstruction of the concept of life that Detlefsen wants to allow 
Descartes, given her adjustments to LifeMK: 
LifeD := x is alive if and only if x has an arrangement of parts which 
(together with motion) enables x to perform determinate life-functions 
(nutrition, growth, reproduction, and reactivity to the environment) for 
the sake of self-preservation. 
LifeD, as Detlefsen herself is well aware (22, 47), introduces teleology to the definition. The 
obvious culprit to blame for this intrusion of teleology is LifeD’s reliance on self-
preservation (because self-preservation is the end the life functions serve). Interestingly, 
Detlefsen does not see self-preservation as the source of the teleology. On the basis of the 
arguments from Shapiro 2003 and Brown 2011, she takes self-preservation to be fairly 
straightforwardly non-teleological (19, 23). Instead, she sees teleology entering the definition 
through the parts that perform the life-functions. Her example is the role of the mitral valve 
in Descartes’s explanation of the heartbeat and its reliance on final causes (24). 
Consequently, even if self-preservation does escape teleology for Descartes (and I am 
somewhat less confident than Detlefsen that it does), teleology still creeps into LifeD—if 
not from the top down through self-preservation itself, then from the bottom up through 
the life functions. 
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LifeD’s reliance on teleology is a problem. As Descartes keeps reminding us, whatever life is, 
it is entirely material (e.g. AT XI: 329–31; AT III: 566), and activity occurs in matter 
(extended substance) exclusively through mechanical means (AT VIIIA: 54, 314). As such, 
matter can have no intrinsic ends, and the only recourse for teleology is through extrinsic 
ends. For manmade artefacts, extrinsic ends are easy to come by: a hammer is for 
hammering because someone designed it with that purpose. Similarly, for natural bodies, 
extrinsic ends would have to come from God: a heart is for pumping blood because God 
designed it with that purpose. 
But Descartes rules out access to God’s intentions and excludes them from any role in 
natural philosophy14: we are limited, while “the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible 
and infinite” and thus “capable of countless things whose causes are beyond my knowledge. 
And for this reason alone I consider the customary search for final causes to be totally 
useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of investigating 
the impenetrable15 purposes of God” (CSM II: 38–9; AT VII: 55).16 Even if God did provide 
natural bodies with extrinsic ends, we could never know about it, making it useless for 
explaining the natural world. In this case, God’s intentions can tell us nothing about what 
life is just because we have no way of knowing what his intentions are. 
Detlefsen offers an ingenious potential solution to the problem of inscrutability: it does not 
matter if we cannot have certain knowledge of God’s intentions, because a well-supported 
                                                   
14 Given Descartes’s insistence that what we think of as the life of humans and animals pertains to extended substance, life 
pertains to natural philosophy (if there is such a thing as life). 
15 The use of “impenetrable” here is an addition in the 1647 French translation approved by Descartes (AT XIa: 44). 
16 See also AT VII: 374–5 and AT VIIIA: 15–16. 
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hypothesis about them will be sufficient to buttress LifeD. The trouble, as Detlefsen notes, 
is that even hypothesising about God’s intentions is off limits for Cartesian natural 
philosophy: 
from Descartes’ point of view, what I suggest above is illegitimate; we cannot 
use teleological explanations in so far as they are grounded in claims about 
God’s purposes even as merely likely true beliefs in our explanations about the 
natural world, and so we cannot explain the teleological nature of (at least 
some) life activities by relying upon hypothetical claims to God’s purposes as 
embodied in (at least some) living bodies 
(Detlefsen: 48). 
Detlefsen argues that, without a concept of life, Descartes would have no way to identify 
living bodies as the subject of the life sciences, which “would render incoherent” his work 
on biology (2). She takes LifeD to be that concept, but notes that Descartes maintains his 
metaphysical commitment to the inscrutability of God’s intentions rather than adopting 
LifeD (48–50). Like Ablondi, Detlefsen upholds the need for a principled conception of life 
at the expense of the coherence of Descartes’s larger system. Ablondi preserves Descartes’s 
biology to the detriment of his metaphysics, in his claim that the textual evidence shows 
that Descartes holds LifeA despite its incompatibility with his ontology. Detlefsen preserves 
Descartes’s metaphysics to the detriment of his biology: retaining the inscrutability of 
God’s intentions in the light of LifeD makes Descartes’s biology incoherent. 
We do not need to force Descartes into such pessimistic outcomes. In the following 
section, I argue that the problem with Descartes’s conception of life is not just with the 
proposed conceptions themselves—it is, first and foremost, with the expectation that he 
have one. 
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3. Descartes and the dissolution of life 
3.1 Dissolution 
The readings of Descartes discussed above have all focused on the need to attribute him 
with a principled means of distinguishing the living from the non-living. Each attempt to do 
so results in either an unworkable concept of life or a strong concept with destructive 
consequences. LifeCH was insufficient. LifeH was too exclusive to be viable. LifeMK was too 
arbitrary and resulted in vacuity. Both LifeA and LifeD ended up imposing incoherence on 
Descartes’s philosophy. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may well be other possible 
answers to the question of what life is for Descartes. It seems likely, however, that there is 
something wrong with the question. 
The trouble is that there is nowhere for the category of life to comfortably reside in 
Descartes’s ontology. He strenuously rejects its presence in thinking substance. Whenever 
he mentions life, he attributes it to extended substance. But extended substance is 
homogeneous: there is no material difference between a human body and a grain mill. 
Attempts to identify aspects of matter that pertain specifically to living things lead to 
arbitrariness and fall apart swiftly (as with LifeCH, LifeH and LifeMK) precisely because there 
is nothing in matter that can make it belong to living things rather than non-living things. 
Matter is matter for Descartes, whether arranged into a clock or into an animal. If thought 
and matter are both ruled out, then seemingly the only recourse for a concept of life is in 
God’s intentions. Unfortunately, God’s intentions are off limits for Cartesian natural 
philosophy: if that is where the definition of life resides, then it is forever hopelessly out of 
reach. It seems that wherever we look for the category of life in Descartes’s ontology, we 
will reach an impasse. 
The solution to the above problems is to not look for a principled concept of life. Descartes 
provides no general, rigorous definition of life because he does not have one. And it is not 
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that he has no such concept because his philosophy is incoherent. It is because he does not 
need one: a concept of life as such plays no role in his biology or in his wider system, and its 
absence is entirely without detriment. Descartes’s aim is not to provide a concept of life, 
but to explain life away. Hall makes the point that “the explanations [Descartes] developed 
were corpuscularized, nonpsychistic versions of psychistic explanations put forth earlier by 
others” (1968: 63; italics removed).17 His method in biology was not to produce “explanations 
of fact” but explanations of “other peoples' explanations (often dismembered and 
reassembled with various additions and deletions)” (1968: 64; italics removed).18 The 
evidence bears this out. Descartes takes on the Aristotelian psychistic conception of life, 
and he indeed dismembers and reassembles it differently, with additions and deletions. In 
other words, he breaks the Aristotelian conception apart and demonstrates piecemeal how 
each of the functions it performs can be produced by nonpyschistic, mechanical 
interactions of matter. Nutrition, for Descartes, is identical to the accretion of blood 
particles in the pores of the organs (AT XI: 245–52). The animation of the body is driven by 
the heat of the heart and the various mechanical processes (respiration, circulation, 
digestion, etc.) that feed into it (Passions 1:8; AT XI, 333). It is through the explanation of the 
various phenomena traditionally associated with life that Descartes deals with life. 
                                                   
17 This is perhaps a good way of understanding Descartes’s defensive remark to Plempius, on having been accused of merely 
replicating Aristotle’s account of the cause of the heartbeat: “If two people arrive at the same place, the one taking the 
right road, the other the wrong one, we ought not to think that the former is following in the footsteps of the latter” (15 
February 1638; CSMK: 80; AT I: 522). 
18 This is not to suggest that Descartes made no innovations. Hall’s point is that the problems Descartes addressed were 
taken from the established treatments of biology, rather than directly from nature; his answers to those problems were 
(largely) his own. 
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In Cartesian reduction, there is an analytic step followed by a synthetic step. The 
phenomenon at hand is broken down into its most basic parts, and then the original 
phenomenon is reconstructed from those basic parts (AT X: 379–87). A reductive 
explanation is able to synthesise the phenomenon it explains from the parts to which the 
phenomenon has been reduced. This is precisely what Descartes does with nutrition, 
animation, sensation, etc. If nutrition is explained as accretion of blood particles in organ 
pores, you have nutrition exactly when you have accretion of blood particles in organ pores. 
This is not, however, what Descartes does with life. When it comes to life, as the previous 
sections of this paper have shown, the category cannot be reconstituted from the material, 
mechanical explanations of the life-phenomena. As we have seen, if we have cardiac heat, 
nutrition, etc., we still cannot reliably distinguish living things from non-living things. 
Descartes does perform the analytic step for life: as outlined above, he reduces everything 
the Aristotelian conception associated with life to mechanical interactions of matter. But he 
does not perform the synthetic step (because he cannot). In this sense, Descartes is not a 
reductionist about life but a strict eliminativist. In the process of analysing life-phenomena, 
Descartes simply dissolves the category of life itself. 
3.2 Objection: Descartes talks about life 
If Descartes dissolves the category of life, then why does he continue to talk about life in all 
the ways outlined in §1? He is certainly not averse to using the term, and his use of it does 
seem to be meaningful. There are several possible replies to this objection. One is simply to 
suggest that, compared to the loss of the coherence of either metaphysics or biology that 
strong reductionist positions about Descartes’s conception of life seem to result in, the 
occasional use of a term with no strict, principled definition seems like a minor infraction, 
especially if nothing of much significance rests on it (see §3.3 below). This is a fairly 
reasonable response, but it is not particularly satisfying. A better variation would be to claim 
that “life,” in this context, is something like a folk term. Just as a strict physicalist might 
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sometimes find it more convenient to talk about desires rather than the specific brain-states 
desires reduce down to, so Descartes finds it more convenient to talk about a living animal 
rather than a non-manmade automaton with whatever attributes and behaviours happen to 
be relevant to the particular automaton in question.19 
A stronger variation on this latter response would point out that “life” is not just a folk term 
for Descartes: it is an Aristotelian term. In almost every instance where Descartes refers to 
life, he is explicitly trying to demonstrate the distinction between his own biology and 
Aristotelian psychistic biology. When Descartes brings up life in both the Treatise on Man 
and the Discourse, it is expressly to point out the redundancy of vegetative and sensitive souls 
(AT XI: 202; AT VI: 45–6). When he does the same in articles five and six of The Passions of 
the Soul, it is to show that taking the soul to animate the body (i.e. the Aristotelian position) 
is a “very serious error” (CSM I: 329; AT XI: 330). Similarly, the discussion of the heartbeat 
in the correspondence with Plempius is in response to Aristotelian objections from both 
Plempius and (initially) Fromondus (AT I: 413–6; AT I: 521–34; and especially AT II: 62–9). 
Descartes does not, then, use the term “life” because it is well-defined in the Cartesian 
system but because it is well-defined in the Aristotelian system—and his aim when using the 
term is to show that all the phenomena an Aristotelian will associate with life are 
mechanistically explicable.20 
                                                   
19 Wolfe (2010: 204) discusses instrumental uses of the term “organism” in modern biology in much the same way. 
20 Somewhat similar aims crop up throughout Descartes’s natural philosophy, of course. In the explanation of fire in the 
World, e.g., Descartes makes a point of how his mechanics can account for just as much as an Aristotelian “form of fire” 
and “quality of heat,” while being both more explanatory and less ontologically extravagant (CSM I: 83; AT XI: 7–9). 
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3.3 Objection: Descartes’s biology needs a principled concept of life 
One of Detlefsen’s major concerns with respect to Descartes’s concept of life is that, 
without a principled concept, Descartes could not identify life; and without life, he could 
have no life sciences, despite his deep commitment to anatomy, physiology and medicine 
(2). It is this concern that, given LifeD, leads Detlefsen to the pessimistic conclusion that 
Descartes’s life sciences are bankrupt (§2.5 above). If Descartes does indeed require a 
principled concept of life to demarcate the discipline of biology, then the dissolutionist 
reading will also lead Descartes’s project into incoherence. 
However, Descartes’s concerns are not those of modern life sciences. Unlike today’s 
science, Descartes had no particular need to protect the disciplinary unity of general 
biology. For Descartes, little would be at risk if the “life sciences” were to entirely collapse 
into physics. Nor did he have any need for a biology capable of dealing with all living things, 
given that he was always perfectly clear that his ultimate aim was (human21) medicine (AT 
IV: 329; AT VI: 62–3; AT VI: 78).22 Consequently, it is not life itself that gives unity to this 
“aspect of his life as a working natural philosopher” (Detlefsen: 2); it is the potential of 
physiology and anatomy for the medical treatment of humans. And since humans are not 
just bodies but unions of soul and body, teleology is not a problem for (human) medicine: 
medicine can legitimately be an end for the Cartesian natural philosopher’s pursuit of 
biology. Life itself, then, is not necessary for constituting the discipline of biology for 
Descartes. Consequently, dissolutionism about life is not a problem for Cartesian biology.  
                                                   
21 Descartes is famously antipathetic towards animal welfare. Veterinary medicine would be a literal oxymoron for him. See 
to More, 5 February 1649 (AT V: 278–9). But cf. Harrison 1992. 
22 On the centrality of medicine in Descartes’s philosophy, see especially Aucante 2006, and Manning’s (2007) extended 
review of the same. 
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4. Conclusion 
Initially, there appear to be good reasons for taking Descartes to be a reductionist about 
life, and for thinking that there is a well-defined, principled concept of life to be found in 
his philosophy. However, attempts to find such a concept result in insufficiency and 
inviability (LifeCH, LifeH) or arbitrariness (LifeMK), or they push Descartes’s system into 
incoherence (LifeA, LifeD). This is because there is nothing in Descartes’s ontology for life 
to be reduced to: it is not a species of thought, extended substance lacks the resources for 
distinguishing living from non-living, and God’s intentions are inscrutable. The alternative is 
to relinquish the requirement for a well-defined, principled concept of life. Rather than 
being a reductionist about life, Descartes dissolves the category. The dissolutionist reading 
makes good sense of Descartes’s unwillingness to produce, or even to discuss, a general 
definition of life, and, unlike the alternatives, it appears to have no negative repercussions 
for Descartes’s system.23 
                                                   
23 Many people have helped improve this paper, amongst whom I owe particular thanks to Peter Anstey, Boris Demarest, 
Dennis Des Chene, Daniel Garber, Laura Georgescu, Alex Levine, Eric Schliesser, Daniel Schneider, Charles Wolfe, and 
the anonymous referees at the Southern Journal of Philosophy. I’m also especially grateful to Karen Detlefsen for sharing 
her forthcoming paper with me, and for granting permission to cite it here. 
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